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NOTE
DON'T ANSWER THE DOOR: Montejo v. Louisiana
RELAXES POLICE RESTRICTIONS FOR QUESTIONING
NON-CUSTODIAL DEFENDANTS
Emily Bretz*
In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Montejo v. Louisiana that a de-
fendant may validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
during police interrogation, even if police initiate interrogation after
the defendant's invocation of the right at the first formal proceeding.
This Note asserts that Montejo significantly altered the Sixth
Amendment protections available to represented defendants. By in-
creasing defendants' exposure to law enforcement, the decision
allows police to try to elicit incriminating statements and waivers of
the right to counsel after the defendant has expressed a desire for
counsel. In order to protect the defendant's constitutional guarantee
of a right to counsel at all critical stages in his prosecution, it is es-
sential to impose higher waiver standards for represented
defendants. Thus, this Note argues that state and lower courts should
adopt a rule that would render invalid any waiver of right to counsel
given in response to police-initiated questioning, regardless of
whether the questioning occurred in a custodial or non-custodial en-
vironment, provided the defendant who waived the right had already
been formally charged and invoked his right to an attorney.
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INTRODUCTION
God asked Eve, "What is this you have done?" Eve, on behalf of everyone,
replied, "The serpent tricked me, and I ate." And so, without the interven-
tion of Miranda warnings, lawyers, or an appellate court, God concluded
the first recorded interrogation and dispensed justice upon Satan and man-
kind.
So begins a recent article by John Bradley, district attorney for William-
son County, Texas. The article goes on to contrast God's approach with the
rule-based interrogation methods used by mortal creatures. After the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Montejo v. Louisiana, however, these interrogation
rules shifted considerably in favor of the prosecution.2 Prior to Montejo, po-
lice could not approach and question defendants once they were formally
charged with a crime, and any subsequent waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was deemed invalid. The Montejo decision effectively elim-
inated these protections. Thus, by allowing police increased opportunities
1. John Bradley, "Did you want a lawyer before your confession?", THE PROSECUTOR,
July-August 2009, http://www.tdcaa.com/node/4811.
2. 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009); Bradley, supra note 1.
3. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
4. Montejo, 129S. CL at 2091.
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to initiate interrogation and secure waivers from represented defendants,
Montejo undermines the purpose of the Sixth Amendment, which serves to
protect the defendant after his first formal judicial proceeding, once "the
government has committed itself to prosecute, and ... the adverse positions
of government and defendant have solidified."'
On September 6, 2002, Jesse Montejo was arrested in connection with
the robbery and murder of Lewis Ferrari. He was brought to the sheriff's
office where, after waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, he was
interrogated for nearly eight hours. Ultimately, Montejo admitted that he
shot and killed Ferrari, who had unexpectedly returned home during the
course of the burglary.8 On September 10, Montejo appeared in court for a
mandatory preliminary hearing. He stood silent while, as a matter of course,
the judge appointed him an attorney from the Office of the Indigent De-
fender.9 Shortly thereafter, two police detectives went to visit Montejo in
jail. After securing another Miranda waiver from the defendant, they re-
quested he accompany them, without his lawyer, on a search for the murder
weapon.'o During this excursion, Montejo wrote a letter, with a pen and pa-
per provided by the police, apologizing to the victim's widow for his
involvement in the murder." Upon his return to the prison, Montejo finally
met his court-appointed attorney.12
The trial court deemed Montejo's waiver admissible, and he was found
guilty and sentenced to death." Affirming, the Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected Montejo's claim that the letter should have been suppressed under
5. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
6. Under Miranda, a suspect must be advised of the following rights before interrogation:
[Tihe right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). If a suspect "knowingly and intelligently waive[s] these rights," police
may proceed with questioning. Id. at 479.
7. State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (La. 2008).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1259. In Louisiana, a judge automatically appoints counsel at the defendant's first
formal hearing. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2094. However, the procedure through which counsel is
appointed varies greatly between the states. In some states, appointment of counsel is automatic
upon a finding of indigency, while other states require that the court inform the defendant of his
right to counsel whereupon he must formally request counsel before any appointment is made. A
third category of states allow appointment to be made either upon the defendant's request or sua
sponte by the court. Id.
10. The police reissued Miranda rights to Montejo because he had reentered police custody.
Miranda warnings must be read any time police seek to interrogate custodial defendants. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444.
11. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1249. At trial, Montejo testified that detectives prompted him to
write the letter, and that much of its contents were suggested by one of the police officers. Id. at
1250 n.49.
12. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2080.
13. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1241.
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Michigan v. Jackson.14 Jackson held that "if police initiate interrogation after
a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right
to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that
police-initiated interrogation is invalid." 5 The Louisiana Supreme Court
reasoned that the protections afforded by Jackson apply only in situations
where defendants actively assert their right to counsel, not in those where
the defendant simply stands mute while counsel is appointed, as was the
case with Montejo.16 Thus, while Montejo's "right to counsel had attached,
he did not assert his right to counsel such that the prophylactic rule of Mich-
igan v. Jackson would invalidate any waiver he would later make."" The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a defendant must
affirmatively accept appointment of counsel in order to validly invoke the
right to counsel under Jackson." Three months after oral arguments, the
Court foreshadowed a potential narrowing of the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tee of counsel, when it asked the parties to brief the following question:
should Jackson be overruled?'9
On May 26, 2009, the Court ruled in the affirmative. In making its de-
termination, the Court considered the right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment (the right to be informed of one's entitlement to an attorney
during custodial interrogation) and under the Sixth Amendment (the right to
actual assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution).20 De-
spite the different protections and purposes of these two amendments, the
Court in Montejo ultimately decided that the waiver procedure for each right
should be identical.2' Although the Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme
Court's holding that a defendant must affirmatively accept counsel, it further
declared that Michigan v. Jackson should be overturned because it was "un-
workable," and because the decision's marginal benefits were outweighed
by its substantial costs. 22 The reasoning in Montejo rested heavily on the
14. Id. at 1261.
15. 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
16. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1261.
17. Id.
18. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2083.
19. Bidish J. Sarma et al., Interrogations and the Guiding Hand of Counsel: Montejo, Ven-
tris, and the Sixth Amendment's Continued Vitality, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 456, 458 (2009)
(citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1667).
20. While the Fifth Amendment serves to protect a suspect's right to an attorney during
custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966), the Sixth Amendment
guarantees counsel not only at trial, but at all pretrial stages where the presence of counsel is "nec-
essary to preserve the defendant's ... right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him
and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
227 (1967).
21. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009).
22. Id. at 2088, 2091. The majority held that the benefits of the Jackson rule were "dwarfed
by its substantial costs"; very few confessions obtained coercively were ever erroneously admitted at
trial, while the rule consistently hindered "'society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and
punishing those who violate the law.'" Id. at 2089 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426
(1986)).
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argument that the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment are suffi-
cient to shield a defendant who does not wish to communicate with officials
without counsel.23 Under Montejo, as long as the defendant is advised of his
Miranda rights before any questioning begins, and knowingly and voluntar-
ily waives his right to counsel, the police may initiate interrogation even if
the defendant invoked counsel at his first judicial appearance.24
Montejo rejected the suggestion of previous courts that Miranda warn-
ings might not suffice to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during
interrogation if a formally charged defendant has already retained counsel.25
The Court found no justification for distinguishing between represented and
26unrepresented defendants. However, because the Court focused primarily
on those defendants who do not invoke counsel, it gave short shrift to those
who do express a desire for representation.27 Indeed, the decision is particu-
larly troubling for defendants who invoke their Sixth Amendment rights in
non-custodial environments. Police can approach those individuals, conduct
an interrogation, and encourage a waiver, even after a defendant requested
281and retained a lawyer. Montejo thereby creates the potential for officers to
infringe upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a par-
ticular stage-interrogation-where having a lawyer is integral to "protect
the fairness of the trial itself."29 A represented defendant who has been for-
mally charged should know the consequences implicated should he
surrender the right to counsel, consequences that can be readily explained
by his attorney.30 While we may afford God more leniency in His casual dis-
regard of Miranda warnings and waiver standards, we cannot allow police
and prosecutors to do the same at the risk of infringing on the constitutional
rights of defendants.
This Note argues that Montejo v. Louisiana improperly restricts the con-
stitutional rights of criminal defendants by creating the possibility that
police will conduct interrogations, without counsel present, of defendants in
non-custodial environments after their Sixth Amendment rights have at-
tached. In light of Montejo's holding, lower courts should adopt measures to
heighten protections for criminal defendants, whether through state judiciar-
ies interpreting their current constitutions to protect the attorney-defendant
relationship or through circuit courts expanding upon federal constitutional
provisions. Part I examines the right to counsel under both the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, and contends that while the cases that preceded Montejo
23. Id. at 2090.
24. Id. at 2088.
25. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 297 n.9 (1988).
26. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090.
27. See id. at 2086-87.
28. See id. at 2090.
29. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 239 (1973); see also Rothgery v. Gillespie
County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2594 (2008) (defining interrogation as a critical stage where the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies).
30. See Faretta v. Califomia, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
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blurred the line between these two separate privileges, Montejo goes one
step further by effectively merging their protections, even in settings where
the defendant invokes and then subsequently waives counsel. Part I also ex-
plains the Supreme Court's conflation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments'
constitutional safeguards and the Court's rejection of separate waiver re-
quirements for represented defendants. Part II asserts that the Miranda
safeguards do very little to protect defendants in non-custodial environments
against coercive police tactics because in such settings these defendants re-
ceive little to no constitutional protection. This Part then demonstrates how,
by removing the presumption of invalidity for waivers following a defen-
dant's invocation of counsel, the Court in Montejo created a window
through which police can exploit defendants to secure a waiver and elicit
incriminating information. Part IHl argues that in order to uphold the original
purposes of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, represented defendants in
non-custodial settings need a heightened waiver standard. Part III explores
different trial strategies that defense attorneys can use to protect clients who
have waived their rights. However, because such tactics may prove ineffec-
tive, Part III ultimately contends that lower courts should mandate a more
stringent waiver standard to better safeguard the constitutional rights of rep-
resented defendants.
I. THE ROAD TO MONTEJO: THE BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND WAIVER UNDER THE FIFrH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
Part I of this Note analyzes how the decision in Montejo v. Louisiana
conflates constitutional doctrine and blurs the protections of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. Section L.A examines the relevant legal background re-
garding the right to counsel and the requirements for waiving that right.
Section I.B analyzes the current waiver standards, demonstrating their uni-
versal applicability in both Fifth and Sixth Amendment contexts. Section I.B
then argues that in failing to acknowledge separate waiver requirements for
represented defendants, the Court has ignored the underlying purposes of
the separate right to counsel guarantees.
A. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments Protect Two Distinct Interests
1. The Purpose of the Fifth Amendment
In order to understand how Montejo merged the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments' right to counsel and the waiver procedures, it is first impor-
tant to grasp the essential differences between the two rights." The Fifth
Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall ... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
31. See generally, Meredith B. Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment
as a Mere "Prophylactic Rule", 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207.
Don't Answer the Door
or property, without due process of law .... 32 Although this constitutional
mandate does not explicitly guarantee a right to an attorney, the privilege
has been interpreted into the Fifth Amendment by Miranda v. Arizona as a
means of protecting a suspect against self-incrimination.3 Because self-
incrimination is a danger inherent in the coercive nature of custodial inter-
rogations," a suspect in such an environment must be clearly advised of his
right to remain silent, his right to counsel, and his right to have an attorney
appointed for him if he is indigent." Thus, while the Fifth Amendment does
not necessarily secure a lawyer for defendants in custodial settings, it does
entitle them to request and consult an attorney. And, should defendants
choose to exercise their rights, the Fifth Amendment shields defendants
36from interrogation without a lawyer present. However, police are not re-
quired to cease interrogation unless a defendant clearly and unambiguously
expresses his desire for counsel.37
The Court expanded the Fifth Amendment privilege in Edwards v. Ari-
zona, holding that where a suspect invokes his right to counsel during a
custodial interrogation, questioning must immediately cease." Police may
not approach the suspect for subsequent interrogation until counsel is pre-
sent,39 unless the suspect himself initiates further communication with
authorities. 0 Further, while the suspect is in custody, police-initiated waivers
are also invalid;4 1 it is presumed that a suspect who invokes counsel consid-
ers himself unable to deal with police pressures without legal assistance.42
Therefore, once the suspect has requested a lawyer, "any subsequent waiver
that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instiga-
tion, is itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures' and not the
purely voluntary choice of the suspect."43 This double layer of prophylaxis
exists not as a constitutional bar, but a court-imposed rule to protect against
self-incrimination, designed to counteract the coercive atmosphere created
by the interplay of police custody and police interrogation.
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
33. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34. Id. at 467 ("[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of per-
sons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise
do so freely.").
35. Id. at 473.
36. Id. at 474.
37. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,459 (1994).
38. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
39. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990).
40. Id. at 150; see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.
41. See Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153.
42. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988).
43. Id. at 681; see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 111 (1975).
44. See, e.g., Halama, supra note 31, at 1213-14; John S. Banas, 1, Case Note, Sixth
Amendment-Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel at Post-Indictment Interrogation, 79
227November 2010]
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2. The Purpose of the Sixth Amendment
Contrary to the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the text of the Sixth
Amendment expressly guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence."45 The right serves a different purpose than its Fifth Amendment
corollary. While the Fifth Amendment is primarily a safeguard against gov-
ernment coercion, the Sixth Amendment aims to protect the integrity of the
adversarial process by minimizing the imbalance between the state, which
has "committed itself to prosecute," and the defendant, who is "faced with
the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies
of substantive and procedural criminal law."6 By insisting that counsel is
available to serve as a "medium" between the accused and the state, 47 the
Sixth Amendment attempts to establish approximate parity between the two
opposing forces.48 Courts and commentators alike have noted that for all
criminal defendants, whatever their status,49 counsel is "indispensible to the
fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice."'o
To ensure the effectiveness of the Sixth Amendment and guarantee due
process, the right to counsel attaches at "a criminal defendant's initial ap-
pearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him
and his liberty is subject to restriction."" The right attaches at this point be-
cause it marks the point at which the suspect becomes the accused, and the
state's role shifts from investigation to accusation in its effort to secure a
52conviction. The right to counsel extends beyond the trial itself to every
J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 817-18 (1988); Thomas Echikson, Case Note, Sixth Amendment-
Waiver After Request for Counsel, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 782 (1986).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. Kirby v. nlinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
47. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
48. See Halama, supra note 31, at 1209.
49. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (recognizing "the obvious truth that
the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought
before a tribunal with [the] power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by
experienced and learned counsel"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (noting the impor-
tance of counsel for both "intelligent and educated lay[men]" and for "the ignorant and illiterate, or
those of feeble intellect").
50. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168-69; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); see also
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (asserting that a lawyer is essential for a fair trial);
James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71
IOWA L. REV. 975, 981 (1986) (noting that counsel "is the sine qua non of fairness in our adversary
system").
51. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008); see also United States
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
attach until the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings); Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (holding that
the Sixth Amendment attaches at the first judicial criminal proceeding against the defendant,
"whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment").
52. Halama, supra note 31, at 1210; see also Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (noting that during one
of "the most critical period[s] of the proceedings"-the time of arraignment until the beginning of
trial-counsel is essential because at that time "consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and prep-
aration [are] vitally important").
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"critical stage" in the prosecution.53 Such critical stages have been defined
as "proceedings between an individual and agents of the State ... that
amount to 'trial-like confrontations,' at which counsel would help the ac-
cused 'in coping with legal problems or ... meeting his adversary.' " Thus,
not only does the Sixth Amendment right protect a defendant's right to
counsel during trial, but also during critical confrontations with the govern-
ment where the absence of counsel might unfairly prejudice the accused's
defense at trial."
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has also been interpreted to pro-
hibit certain types of police questioning in the absence of counsel. And,
unlike the Miranda rights, once proceedings have commenced, the Sixth
Amendment protections against police investigatory techniques apply both
inside and outside the context of custodial interrogation. For example, in
United States v. Massiah, the defendant had been charged, had obtained a
lawyer, and had been released on bail. 7 He made incriminating statements
to a codefendant who had agreed to work with the government in its investi-
gation, and those statements were later used as evidence against the
defendant at trial." In Massiah, the Supreme Court held that the prosecu-
tion, by orchestrating this meeting, obtaining the incriminating statements,
and relying on them at trial, had violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.59 Once the right to counsel has attached, the Sixth Amend-
ment renders inadmissible statements "deliberately elicited" from a
defendant in the absence of counsel," unless there is an express waiver of
61the constitutional right.
Following the Massiah line of cases, the Court continued to reinforce its
rule barring elicitation of incriminating statements from defendants outside
the presence of counsel. Brewer v. Williams extended the Sixth Amendment
protections to cover situations wherein police officers "deliberately and de-
signedly set out to elicit information" from indicted defendants.6 Taking
53. Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2591-92; see also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961)
(determining that arraignment was a critical stage of the proceedings and thereby triggered the right
to counsel). Hamilton was one of the first cases to use the "critical stage" language.
54. Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2591 n.16 (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 226, and United States v.
Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1973)); see also United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1569 (1lth Cir.
1993) (finding that a critical stage includes all instances in which the advice of counsel is necessary
to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial, or in which the absence of counsel could impair the prep-
aration or presentation of a defense).
55. E.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); Wade, 388 U.S. at 226.
56. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274
(1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399-401 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
206 (1964).
57. 377 U.S. at 201.
58. Id. at 202-03.
59. Id. at 206-07.
60. Id. at 206.
61. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 403-05.
62. Id. at 399.
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advantage of a defendant's isolation from his attorney to obtain as much
incriminating information as possible is comparable to, "and perhaps more
63effective[] than," a formal interrogation of the accused. Although at the
post-indictment stage, the government may continue its investigation of a
defendant's suspected criminal activities," "once adversary proceedings
have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representa-
tion" during interrogation.
It is crucial to recognize the difference between the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel to understand how Montejo undermines the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment and ultimately diminishes the ability of
future defendants to rely upon its protections. In assuming that Fifth
Amendment prophylaxes are adequate to protect the right to counsel once
adversarial proceedings have begun, the Court in Montejo ignored the very
reason why the Sixth Amendment is triggered at the defendant's first formal
judicial appearance: at that point, the role of counsel is not to provide pro-
tection against the inherently compelling pressures of police custody, but
rather to offer meaningful assistance in mounting a defense against the "pro-
secutorial forces of organized society" by providing aid at the critical stage
of interrogation.& Montejo allows authorities to circumvent the assistance of
counsel by providing only Fifth Amendment protections in Sixth Amend-
ment contexts: that is, only prohibiting interrogation when the defendant
invokes his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. But the Sixth
68Amendment was designed to protect more than just these limited instances.
The rationale behind the Sixth Amendment, that which drove the Jackson
rule and was disregarded in Montejo, is to protect the integrity of the attor-
ney-client relationship throughout all pretrial critical stages when the state
might take advantage of the accused or where the defendant requires advice
on how best to confront his adversary.
63. Id.
64. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207.
65. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401.
66. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct.
2079, 2085 (2009) (holding that interrogation by the state is a critical stage).
67. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089-90; cf Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)
(holding that, under Miranda, police may not question a suspect in custody further after the suspect
invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, unless the suspect initiates further contact).
68. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n.5 (1986) ("[A]fter the initiation of adversary
judicial proceedings, the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel at a 'critical stage' even when
there is no interrogation and no Fifth Amendment applicability."). For example, the Sixth Amend-
ment provides a right to counsel at a post-indictment lineup even though the Fifth Amendment is not
implicated. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
69. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1973).
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B. Waiver Standards
1. Waiver Requirements Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
Currently, the basic requirements for waivers of the right to counsel-
under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments-are governed by the test set
forth in Johnson v. Zerbst.o There, the Court articulated that an effective
waiver requires an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege."' Subsequent Court decisions bolstered the Zerbst stan-
dard, explaining that an effective waiver of the right to counsel hinged on
whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily surrendered
that privilege. When the Miranda Court created a Fifth Amendment right
to counsel, it adopted the Zerbst requirements of a voluntary, knowing, and
73intelligent waiver.
In a line of cases since Miranda, the Supreme Court has developed ex-
plicit procedural requirements for waiving the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. First, no effective waiver can be given if a suspect has not previ-
ously been informed of his right to an attorney.74 If a suspect requests the
presence of a lawyer while in custody, police must cease interrogation, and
any subsequent waiver during a police-initiated interaction will be deemed
invalid.75 The suspect himself may contact law enforcement officials and
waive his right to counsel, but the court must still examine whether "the
purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the
totality of the circumstances."
Sixth Amendment waiver guidelines have traditionally been far more
ambiguous than those requirements set by Miranda and its progeny.7 While
the Zerbst standard set a clear (albeit broad) constitutional baseline for Sixth
Amendment cases, it is rarely dispositive in resolving the validity of a
70. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
71. Id. at 464.
72. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-04 (1977); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (holding that a suspect's waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation
must be given "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently"). Since Brewer, however, many critics
assert that this knowing and voluntary standard has become an empty requirement. See infra Section
III.A.2.
73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). Since the Fifth Amendment right to coun-
sel did not exist prior to the 1966 Miranda decision, courts had no reason to analyze waivers in such
contexts. In contrast, because of the Sixth Amendment's explicit guarantee of the right to counsel,
the Supreme Court faced the question of waiving that constitutional privilege much earlier. Even
though Zerbst involved a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Miranda court still
elected to adopt an identical standard for Fifth Amendment waivers.
74. Id. at 471. But a suspect can validly waive his rights during a police-initiated custodial
interrogation as long as he is first informed of his rights and then fails to invoke counsel. Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975).
75. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1981).
76. Id. at 486 n.9. However, the court will only perform a totality-of-the-circumstances test if
the waiver is deemed involuntary-for example, if there is official objective coercion. See infra
Section EI.A.2.
77. Banas, supra note 44, at 821-23.
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waiver 78: courts are still obligated to perform a case-by-case analysis, look-
ing at all "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.""9 More-
over, waivers in the Zerbst case dealt with relinquishment of the right to
assistance of counsel at trial, not during interrogation. Finally, following
Zerbst, much of Sixth Amendment doctrine evolved in contexts of surrepti-
tious police questioning, where the issue of waiver was irrelevant;so since
defendants were not aware they were speaking with the police agents, they
had no occasion to waive their right to counsel.8' In these cases the Supreme
Court found violations of the Sixth Amendment because the state "deliber-
ately elicited" inculpatory statements from the unwitting defendant in the
absence of counsel." The deliberate elicitation analysis includes situations
where the government, through its own overt agent, acts with the purpose of
eliciting incriminating information from the accused." Waiver was generally
not an issue in these cases, and thus, confusion regarding Sixth Amendment
waiver standards persisted.
2. Merging the Waiver Analyses
In Montejo, the Court decided that if a defendant was issued Miranda
warnings, originally designed to protect his Fifth Amendment rights, he
could validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present dur-
ing post-arraignment questioning.8 In practice, this allows police on the
street to approach a defendant released on bail, secure a waiver, and begin
questioning, regardless of whether the defendant has counsel. A defendant in
custody has more protection, but only if he invoked his right to counsel dur-
ing interrogation; if not, he too can be reapproached for questioning. Under
78. C. Allen Parker, Jr., Note, Proposed Requirements for Waiver of the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 363, 364-66 (1982).
79. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
80. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
81. Echikson, supra note 44, at 784.
82. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (finding a violation of the Sixth
Amendment where the state knowingly attempted to circumvent the defendant's right to counsel by
using a codefendant to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the accused); Henry, 447
U.S. at 274 (holding that the government violated the defendant's right to counsel by intentionally
and surreptitiously creating a situation where he was likely to make incriminating statements); Mas-
siah, 377 U.S. at 206 (finding that incriminating information "deliberately elicited" from the
defendant after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel must be excluded from evi-
dence).
83. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977) (finding waiver of counsel invalid
where the state had "specific intent to elicit incriminating statements" and could not show that de-
fendant knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right).
84. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085-86 (2009).
85. Even if that defendant did invoke counsel during custodial interrogation, once released
from custody, police may reinitiate contact fourteen days later. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct.
1213, 1222-23 (2010); see also infra text accompanying notes 162-164.
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the initial Jackson rule, these waivers would have been deemed invalid, and
16
any subsequent statements obtained rendered inadmissible.
Montejo is just the latest in a string of cases that conflate the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. Some scholars argue that the confu-
sion between the two rights began in Miranda v. Arizona,"8 where the Court,
in efforts to protect against police coercion, held that individuals must be
informed of their right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation.9 In Mich-
igan v. Jackson, the Court held that the Edwards bar on custodial
interrogations should also apply in post-arraignment settings due to the
heightened importance of guaranteeing counsel once a defendant has been
formally charged." Accordingly, if a defendant requested an attorney at his
arraignment, any Sixth Amendment waiver obtained during a subsequent
police-initiated custodial interrogation should be deemed invalid." However,
while Jackson granted increased protections to all defendants at the com-
mencement of adversarial proceedings, the Court based much of its opinion
on the determination that "additional safeguards are necessary when the
accused asks for counsel."92 This holding allowed future Court decisions to
rest on the notion that the Sixth Amendment privilege is only available to
the defendant when he explicitly and affirmatively invokes counsel,3 despite
the fact that no such request is needed to invoke that right.94
In Patterson v. Illinois, the Court shifted its waiver analysis, finding that
waivers of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel occurring after a defendant
had been charged were not per se invalid.95 In Patterson, the defendant did
not have an attorney appointed, nor did he request one. He waived his right
86. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
87. Sarma et al., supra note 19, at 456.
88. See Jeremy M. Miller, Law and Disorder: The High Court's Hasty Decision in Miranda
Leaves a Tangled Mess, 10 CHAP. L. REv. 713, 714-15 (2007). Miller maintains that the Miranda
Court should have relied upon "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel," finding it to "attach[] when
the suspect is placed in jail or even arrested" instead of creating "a non-existent aspect of the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause." Id. By doing so, Miller argues, the Court laid the ground-
work for a bewildering right-to-counsel jurisprudence that is "riddled with exceptions." Id. at 716.
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467-68 (1966).
90. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632. ("[Tlhe Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraign-
ment interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at
any custodial interrogation."). See supra Section I.A.2 for a discussion of the development and
importance of the Sixth Amendment.
91. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
92. Id. at 636 (emphasis added) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Halama, supra note 31, at 1225. Admittedly, the Court in Jackson did try to prevent such
an outcome, by affirming that "[t]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defen-
dant." Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633 n.6 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)). Future
courts, however, gave short shrift to this declaration.
94. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404; Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) ("[T]he right to
be furnished counsel does not depend on a [defendant's] request.").
95. 487 U.S. 285 (1988); see also Banas, supra note 44, at 823.
96. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 287-88.
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to counsel during post-indictment interrogation, and then made voluntary,
inculpatory statements at interviews initiated by law enforcement officials.9
Distinguishing the case from Jackson, where the accused requested a law-
yer, the Patterson Court found that even though the defendant's right to
counsel had attached, he failed to exercise his right to an attorney because
he did not explicitly assert his desire for counsel; therefore, his waiver was
valid." The Court analogized the situation to a pre-indictment interrogation,
where the suspect has a constitutional privilege, but does not rely upon it.9
As in Fifth Amendment context, authorities are only barred from interroga-
tion when the defendant actively invokes his right to counsel, thereby
triggering Sixth Amendment protections.'"
The Court's holding in Patterson, however, was limited to situations
where the defendant has been told of his indictment but has not requested,
nor obtained, counsel.'o' Moreover, the Court was clear to stress the point
that the protections of Jackson were still in effect.'02 Finally, although the
Court did find that for purposes of post-indictment interrogations, Miranda
warnings are generally sufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it further qualified its hold-
ing.'03 Because the Sixth Amendment serves as an important safeguard of
the attorney-client relationship and its protections extend beyond those of
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, "there will be cases where a waiver
which would be valid under Miranda will not suffice for Sixth Amendment
purposes."'0" Thus, the Patterson Court suggested that in certain situations-
particularly when the defendant was represented or the police sought to en-
gage in surreptitious questioning-Miranda warnings would not be
adequate to alert a defendant to the rights he was surrendering, nor could
they uniformly establish an effective waiver of the right to counsel.' 5
97. Id. at 288.
98. Id. at 290-91.
99. Id. at 291.
100. Id; see also Moran v. Burbine 475 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1986) (holding that a defendant
who did not request counsel may validly waive his right to counsel at a pre-indictment proceeding,
despite the fact that a lawyer had been retained for him).
101. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 291.
102. Id. at 293 n.5 ("Moreover, even within this limited context, we note that petitioner's
waiver was binding on him only so long as he wished it to be. Under [Michigan v. Jackson], at any
time during the questioning petitioner could have changed his mind, elected to have the assistance of
counsel, and immediately dissolve the effectiveness of his waiver with respect to any subsequent
statements... . Our decision today does nothing to change this rule.") (internal citations omitted).
103. Id. at 296 ("As a general matter, then, an accused who is admonished with the warnings
prescribed by this Court in Miranda has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth
Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this
basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.") (internal citations omitted).
104. Id. at 297 n.9.
105. Id. at 296--97 n.9 ("[Not] all Sixth Amendment challenges to the conduct of postindict-
ment questioning will fail whenever the challenged practice would pass constitutional muster under
Miranda. For example, we have permitted a Miranda waiver to stand where a suspect was not told
that his lawyer was trying to reach him during questioning; in the Sixth Amendment context, this
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3. Montejo and Its Implications for Sixth Amendment Waivers
Although the Court in Patterson left the door open for a more extensive
definition of Sixth Amendment waiver standards, the unequivocal Montejo
reaction was to turn the lock and hide the key. Despite Jackson's clear intent
to bolster "the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between [the defen-
dant] and the State" at all critical confrontations following the initiation of
formal charges," and despite the fact that the word "badger" never appears
in the Jackson majority opinion, the Montejo Court held that the Jackson
rule served only to protect against police badgering a defendant into waiving
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' Relying on this logic, Montejo held
that because the Miranda warnings protect against badgering and police
compulsion, in cases involving waivers of the right to counsel, a waiver of
Miranda rights will typically suffice to waive the Sixth Amendment right
during interrogation."8 Therefore, due to the protections provided by Miran-
da and its progeny, the Jackson rule was unnecessary." As noted, however,
the Miranda warnings do not suggest to a defendant the implications of
what he is giving up."o Moreover, even assuming that protection against
badgering was the basis for the Jackson rule, allowing police to secure
waivers with Miranda warnings alone does not fully protect against police
compulsion. Particularly, represented defendants in non-custodial environ-
ments have little protection against police who can navigate around the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment, utilizing the Montejo loophole to con-
vince a defendant to waive his constitutional right."'
II. THE EFFECTS OF MONTEJO ON REPRESENTED DEFENDANTS
IN NON-CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENTS
Part II asserts that the Court's failure in Montejo to fully distinguish
between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments will impair the rights of non-
custodial defendants who have requested counsel." 2 First, Section II.A
highlights the differences between custodial and non-custodial questioning
waiver would not be valid. Likewise a surreptitious conversation between an undercover police
officer and an unindicted suspect would not give rise to any Miranda violation as long as the 'inter-
rogation' was not in a custodial setting; however, once the accused is indicted, such questioning
would be prohibited.") (internal citations omitted).
106. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
107. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086 (2009). This issue was a serious source of
contention between the majority and dissent. While Justice Scalia declined to recognize the histori-
cal rationale for Sixth Amendment protections and the different purposes of the two amendments,
the point was discussed at great length by the dissent. Id. at 2096-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 2085-86 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 2089-90.
110. See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. See infra Section H.A.
112. Throughout this Note I will refer to "non-custodial defendants." This terminology is a
short-hand reference to defendants who face police encounters in non-custodial settings.
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and discuss the original rationale for heightened protections in custodial
interrogation. Section II.B illustrates that, as a result of the increased protec-
tions for defendants in custody, police have become adroit in the realm of
non-custodial investigation, developing coercive techniques that pose con-
cerns about the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver. Section II.C then
demonstrates how, in a post-Montejo world, police are able to use such co-
ercive tactics on represented defendants. Montejo's holding creates the risk
that police will adopt strategies that might violate defendants' constitutional
rights and the guarantee of the right to counsel during interrogation.
A. Montejo and the Relevance of Custodial Interrogation
The protections eroded by the Montejo decision were necessary to pre-
vent police from interrogating defendants in non-custodial situations. The
holding allows police to question defendants outside of custody even if they
invoke their right to an attorney. Whereas under Miranda suspects who had
not yet been formally charged always had less protection in non-custodial
settings, Montejo extends the custody line past a defendant's first judicial
appearance, continuing to grant fewer protections to those outside of cus-
tody even after attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.H3 The
original justifications for distinguishing between custodial and non-custodial
situations do not warrant the diminished protections authorized by Montejo.
The tactics used by police to secure waivers and obtain incriminating infor-
mation are identical in both Fifth and Sixth Amendment settings, and such
tactics can significantly undermine the defendant's relationship with his at-
torney.
Traditionally, interrogations have been understood to be necessarily cus-
todial-a notion initially promulgated by Miranda.'14 There, the Court
defined interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way.""' The Court found that such police
interrogations were inherently intimidating and involved distinct pressures
designed to compel statements and confessions in a manner violative of a
suspect's right against self-incrimination. But, while Miranda did strive to
diminish the coercive nature of "police-dominated" interrogations by de-
manding enhanced procedural safeguards,"' the Court assumed that only
interrogations in custody contain inherently compelling pressures." As a
113. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090.
114. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 444, 458, 467.
117. Id. at 444-45.
118. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1547 (2009). Weis-
selberg explains that the Miranda Court "assumed that the element of 'custody' would effectively
separate interrogations that contain inherently compelling pressures from those that do not." Id.
After conducting a comprehensive study of several police departments, he found that in order to
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result, it suggested that Miranda's prophylactic protections applied only to
custodial defendants.119
Because Miranda referred specifically to custodial interrogations, only
defendants in police custody are entitled to its protections,12 and to the re-
lated rights guaranteed by Edwards v. Arizona.1 2 1 Subsequent Court
holdings have clung to this notion, refusing to grant defendants constitu-
tional protections when facing questioning in non-custodial environments.12
Additionally, the Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged that it is in-
significant if defendants face coercion in non-custodial situations.I" Instead
of focusing on Miranda's concern for compelling police pressures that
might violate a defendant's constitutional rights, the Court has explained
that the only relevant Miranda consideration is whether there has been a
"'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associ-
ated with a formal arrest."'2 4 If no such restriction is found, officers are
granted substantial freedom in their investigatory techniques.
B. Deceptive Police Techniques and the Focus on
Non-Custodial Questioning
Montejo's effect of weakening defendant rights in non-custodial envi-
ronments becomes more meaningful as police often focus on non-custodial
interrogations. Due to the protections automatically triggered when a sus-
pect invokes counsel during a custodial interrogation, 12 and the failure of
the Court to provide similar protections to defendants outside of custody,
police have made significant efforts to conduct questioning in ostensibly
avoid custodial interrogation, officers often followed the approach of Calfornia v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983) (per curiam), which held that advising a suspect that "he or she is free to leave and
[does] not [have to] answer questions" renders Miranda warnings unnecessary. Weisselberg, supra,
at 1542. Therefore, "officers are now consistently trained in a tactic that allows them to remove a
significant category of interrogations from the reach of Miranda." Id. at 1547. But, "[blecause the
practice of giving Beheler admonishments has varying effects when coupled with different interro-
gation techniques, giving Beheler warnings does not uniformly make stationhouse interrogations
less coercive. The bottom line is that the evidence only partially supports the assumption that 'cus-
tody' identifies interrogations that contain compelling pressures." Id.
119. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
120. Id. at 471 (finding that a suspect must be informed of his right to counsel before he can
validly waive his rights).
121. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) ("[A]n accused . .. having expressed his desire to deal with
the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until coun-
sel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication
.... ). See supra Section I.B.l.
122. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1123; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977).
123. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 ("Miranda warnings are not required 'simply because the
questioning takes place in the station house or because the questioned person is one whom the po-
lice suspect.'"); Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 ("[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in
which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a 'coercive envi-
ronment."').
124. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
125. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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"non-custodial" settings.126 A significant body of evidence, including multi-
ple studies of police departments,12 the comments of academic scholars'28
and even recommendations from a widely accepted officer interrogation
manual, suggest that since Miranda, police have intentionally focused
their efforts on securing inculpatory statements from defendants in non-
custodial interrogations. They do so because a suspect may be less likely
to realize that he should seek the assistance of counsel, and more likely to
inadvertently reveal incriminating evidence."' A recently published police
manual explains to officers the importance of avoiding "unnecessary" Mi-
randa warnings in order to secure the maximum number of admissible
confessions. It advises:
Because warnings are only required prior to custodial interrogation, one
way to minimize the adverse impact of Miranda on investigations is to try
to conduct interrogations whenever possible in non-custodial settings (such
126. Richard A. Leo, From coercion to deception: the changing nature of police interrogation
in America, 18 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 43-44 (1992). However, non-custodial scenarios are
not always easy to identify. While the traditional assumption of non-custodial is at home or on the
street, a lack of custody has also been found when the suspect is questioned in his car or at the po-
lice station. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121. Indeed, a
prisoner rereleased into the general prison population has also been deemed not to be in custody. See
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010); infra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation
11 CRiM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1992, at 3, 5 ("[P]olice will question suspects in a 'non-
custodial' setting ... so as to circumvent the necessity of rendering warnings. This is the most
fundamental, and perhaps the most overlooked, deceptive stratagem police employ."); Weisselberg,
supra note 118, at 1542-43 (quoting a police manual instructing its officers that if "the subject
appears to be uncooperative and not likely to waive, consider taking the coerciveness (i.e., the 'cus-
tody') out of the interrogation by simply informing him that he is not under arrest ... and interview
the subject without a Miranda admonishment and waiver.").
128. See, e.g., Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Ad-
missibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 007, 1020 (1988)
(stating that police will be able to undertake interrogation "in a non-custodial environment in order
to avoid having to administer warnings and secure waivers"); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L.
Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REv. 69, 112
(1990) (suggesting that police circumvent Miranda by conducting coercive non-custodial interviews
in suspects' homes); see also Yale Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Mi-
randa, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION-SOURCES AND COMMENTARIES 335, 341 (John
W. Reed et al. eds., 1968) ("I think it is quite legitimate to read Miranda as encouraging the police
to engage more extensively in pre-arrest, pre-custody, pre-restraint questioning.").
129. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 506-07 (4th ed.
2004) (The Supreme Court's decision in Mathiason "is an excellent illustration of the advisability of
arranging, whenever feasible, for an interrogation opportunity based upon a consensual situation. A
suspect who has willingly consented to come to or be taken to the place of interrogation . . . is not in
custody .... ).
130. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 873-34 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 275-76 (1996).
131. See Weisselberg, supra note 118, at 1547 (finding that minimization techniques-those
in which the interrogator justifies or downplays the significance of the crime--used in non-custodial
environments may create sufficient compelling pressures to induce the defendant to confess). But
see Cassel & Hayman, supra note 130, at 883-84 (finding that police were somewhat less successful
in non-custodial interviews, but also noting that police effectively used telephone calls to question
non-custodial defendants).
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as at the suspect's home or on the street, without arrest-like restraints)....
[I]t is also possible to interrogate an un-arrested suspect at the police sta-
tion without warnings, if the situation is handled properly.3 2
Both courtsl 3  and scholars'3 have recognized the ability of officers to
transform questioning scenarios and employ softly coercive techniques that
create, in non-custodial settings, the very compelling pressures that Miranda
sought to eliminate. Because interrogations are conventionally seen as cus-
todial, law-enforcement officers have shied away from the phrase
"interrogation" when referring to their questioning, adopting instead the
less-threatening term "interview," regardless of when or where the question-
ing takes place."' This reflects a conscious effort by law enforcement to
reduce the perception of intimidation associated with questioning, despite
the fact that questioning techniques are virtually indistinguishable in the two
situations.'36 Thus, merely by engaging in some semantic manipulation,
police can transform what might otherwise be considered an "interrogation"
into an "interview," thereby "removing police questioning from the realm of
judicial control."'"
Police also can rely on certain tactics to elicit incriminating evidence in
non-custodial situations (and procure waivers if Miranda warnings are
132. Devallis Rutledge, Non-Custodial Stationhouse Interrogations: How to talk to suspects
without Mirandizing, POLICE: THE L. ENFORCEMENT MAG., Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.policemag.com/
Channel/Patrol/Articles/2009/01/Non-Custodial-Stationhouse-Interrogations.aspx.
133. E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) ("[A non-custodial inter-
rogation may] be characterized as one where 'the behavior of .. . law enforcement officials was
such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined
. . . ..') (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)). Cf State v. Haddock, 897 P.2d 152,
162 (Kan. 1995) (finding an interview non-custodial that took place at a police station where the
defendant asked if the officer thought he needed a lawyer and the officer responded that he did not at
that point).
134. E.g., Weisselberg, supra note 118, at 1545-47. Weisselberg studied police departments in
California and concluded that the label of "custody" does not always identify interrogations that
contain compelling pressures; rather, questioning in technically non-custodial settings, when cou-
pled with different interrogation techniques, may actually be coercive. Cf George C. Thomas In,
The End of the Road For Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and Future of Rules For Police Inter-
rogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15, 18 (2000). While a broad reading of Miranda suggests that
"every statement is compelled if made in response to custodial police interrogation," id. at 14, a
statement still can be compelled if given involuntarily, regardless of where it was made.
135. In academic scholarship, the term "interview" tends to refer to a non-accusatory process,
the purpose of which is to gather information, while an "interrogation" is by nature accusatory and
custodial, involves persuasion, and the suspect is believed to be guilty. INBAu, supra note 129, at 4-
5.
136. See DAVID E. ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTER-
VIEW AND INTERROGATION 4-5 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that in practice, the terms "interview"
and "interrogation" are often used interchangeably); see also Real Police Magazine, Thread:
interview vs. interrogation, http://www.realpolice.net/forums/ask-cop-ll2/29044-interview-vs-
interrogation.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2010). This posting site, though admittedly informal,
does represent at least the possibility that police affirmatively try to question suspects in less
restrictive environments.
137. Leo, supra note 126, at 44; see also Skolnick & Leo, supra note 127, at 5.
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eventually issued)."' One common method is known as the "minimization"
technique, wherein an officer will justify or minimize the gravity of the of-
fense, causing the suspect to wrongly infer he will be treated leniently and
confess.139 Alternatively, police often rely on "maximization"-a strategy
designed to increase the suspect's anxiety and foster a sense of hopeless-
ness.'" Officers may exaggerate the strength of the evidence against the
defendant or inflate the magnitude of his charges.141
C. Use of Coercive Techniques Once the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel Has Attached
Proponents of the new Montejo rule may respond that concerns about
coercive police tactics are unwarranted after the attachment of a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel due to the protections guaranteed by Mi-
randa. When police seek to question defendants after their first formal
appearance, Miranda warnings, followed by an effective waiver of counsel,
are mandatory.142 Even when warnings are given to defendants, however,
techniques used by officers in non-custodial settings could be effective ma-
nipulation tools in custodial settings as well; these techniques may be used
not only to gain information, but also to secure waivers of the right to coun-
sel.143 Police can manipulate the reading of warnings themselves,'4 or
138. See Leo, supra note 126, at 53-54 (concluding that "the use of force and duress to elicit
confessions has given way to psychologically sophisticated tricks, ploys, and stratagems," the latter
of which still entail "morally troubling social costs").
139. Cf Miller v. Fenton, 796 F2d 598, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding a confession volun-
tary where the interrogating officer suggested to the suspect that he would not receive jail time but
psychological treatment); see also Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 277 (2006); Saul M. Kassin &
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 Psy-
CHOL. ScL. PUBL. INT. 33, 43 (2004).
140. See Feld, supra note 139, at 274-77; see also Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 139, at
43.
141. See, e.g., Walker v. Goord, 427 F. Supp. 2d 272, 276-77 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (a confession
was held to be voluntary where the officer told the suspect that the victim had uttered a dying decla-
ration naming the suspect as the killer, and that several other witnesses saw the suspect flee the
scene of the crime, even though the officer later admitted his statements regarding the dying declara-
tion and other eyewitness were untrue); see also Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social
Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions,
16 STUD. L., POL., & Soc'Y 189, 192 (1997).
142. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009); Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285, 292 n.4 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
143. See United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a voluntary
waiver where, prior to questioning, a non-custodial suspect spoke with an agent who was also a
Mormon priest). The agent-priest reminded the suspect about potential spiritual ramifications, the
belief in the need to repent, and the fact that "this belief stipulated the need ... for confession ...
includ[ing] a candid account of all that had taken place, so that an assessment could be made of the
harm done." Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 134, at 18-19 ("Judges seem to assume that once a
suspect knows his rights and chooses to talk to the police, any subsequent statement must be volun-
tary. But the pressure and trickery that can follow a waiver make this assumption doubtful.").
144. In their interviews with police and investigators, Skolnick and Leo find that police "con-
sciously recite the [Miranda] warnings in a manner intended to heighten the likelihood of eliciting a
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engage in a combination of practices known together as "softening up" the
accused.145 The latter method may include understating the importance of
Miranda warnings; 146 seeking to persuade suspects to waive by explaining
"that there are two sides to every story and that [officers] will only be able
to hear the suspect's side of the story if he waives his rights and chooses to
speak to them,"' 47 and "describing the evidence against [defendants] and
making their situations appear hopeless" before issuing warnings or obtain-
ing a waiver.148 By illustrating the possible consequences of refusing to
speak with police, officers can influence a defendant's decision to waive his
rights, especially if there are only vague limits on law enforcement in Sixth
Amendment contexts.149
Indeed, one of the most troubling aspects of Montejo is that it grants po-
lice additional opportunities to conduct the tactics mentioned above, even on
non-custodial defendants who have explicitly requested counsel.5 o Though
police or prosecutors may suggest that a represented defendant might simply
change his mind about waiving counsel, such claims are suspect since repre-
sented defendants "who assert their right to counsel are unlikely to waive
that right voluntarily in subsequent interrogations.""'
A represented defendant should not be barred from waiving his rights or
prevented from confessing, if he so chooses. However, he should be entitled
to make that choice with the assistance of his attorney, who can guide him
on what to say to police officers and to the court, and how best to secure an
waiver"-i.e., "in a flat, perfunctory tone of voice to communicate that the warnings are merely a
bureaucratic ritual." Skolnick & Leo, supra note 127, at 5; see also Weisselberg, supra note 118, at
1564.
145. Weisselberg, supra note 118, at 1548, 1554-62; see also Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 660-62 (1996); Robert P. Mosteller, Police
Deception Before Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified
Practice at the Most Critical Moment, 39 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1239, 1260-61 (2007).
146. Leo, supra note 145, at 662-63.
147. Id. at 664.
148. Weisselberg, supra note 118, at 1548. Weisselberg describes "softening up" in the con-
text of Fifth Amendment violations, explaining that it can happen in one of two ways: 1) the officer
asks questions, receives incriminating statements, and then issues warnings, only to have the defen-
dant subsequently confess; and 2) the officer may discuss the case at length with the defendant,
detailing the charges and possible consequences (either in a deceptive manner or not) and then give
warnings. Id. at 1554-62. The second technique is particularly relevant in the Sixth Amendment
context.
149. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1969); United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d
1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993); cf Ofshe & Leo, supra note 141, at 192 (finding that, while not overtly
coercive, the indirect interrogation method of "communicating benefits or harms is little more than a
method for eliciting confessions by circumventing well established legal protections").
150. It is true that many states still discourage police from initiating interaction with repre-
sented defendants without first speaking to counsel. For example, the Rules of Professional Conduct
endorsed by the American Bar Association generally prohibit prosecutors from making direct con-
tact with represented defendants, and police officers have been trained to refrain from approaching
represented defendants absent direction from prosecutors. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079,
2098 n.4 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, this does not mean that such police practice is
universally accepted. Additionally, Montejo allows police to increasingly push the boundaries of
Sixth Amendment limitations.
151. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
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advantageous bargain.152 Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, po-
lice should not be able to continue their manipulation of interrogative
settings in the absence of a lawyer because of the greater risk for constitu-
tional violations of that right.' And, although police may purport to be able
to make offers in the best interest of defendants, it is doubtful that, once ad-
versarial proceedings have commenced, one could "wear the hat of an
effective adviser to a criminal defendant while at the same time wearing the
hat of a law enforcement authority."5 4
Ideally, police would always respect the first invocation of counsel, and
refrain from repeatedly requesting that a defendant reconsider his waiver
decision. But, realistically, once state forces are committed to the prosecu-
tion of one individual, if there is a possibility for police to accumulate
additional incriminatory evidence and bolster a case against the accused, it
may be in their best interest to reinitiate contact, particularly if the prosecu-
tion is not confident in the trial outcome."' This is made evident by a recent
law enforcement magazine demonstrating that police can and will take ad-
vantage of this new opportunity for questioning:
Under the Montejo ruling, it will now be possible for law enforcement of-
ficers to attempt to obtain a waiver and an admissible statement from a
defendant without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment, even after he
has been indicted or has made his first court appearance on the case and
has an attorney, or has asked for one. The court imposed no time limit on
this new opportunity for questioning, which could presumably occur even
during pretrial proceedings or the trial itself.
152. E.g., United States v. Satterfield, 417 F. Supp. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 558 F.2d 655
(2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that after indictment, a defendant "cannot make any arrangement with
agents or prosecutor that is not subject to ultimate approval by the court, and counsel is obviously
important to advise him on what terms such approval is likely to be forthcoming and how best to
obtain it").
153. The Montejo Court suggests as much, explaining that the decision applies to "defen-
dant[s] like Montejo, who ha[ve] done nothing at all to express" their desire for counsel, nor
demonstrated any unwillingness to speak without an attorney, as opposed to those defendants who
have indicated their desire for a lawyer. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2086-87. The majority further asserts
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees are "meant to prevent police from badgering defen-
dants into changing their minds about their rights" once they have decided a lawyer should be
present; thus, it would seem that if a defendant did invoke counsel, he should not be drawn into an
interrogation, nor should he have to continuously reassert his rights. Id. at 2087. The Court ac-
knowledges that it may be "reasonable to presume from a defendant's request for counsel that any
subsequent waiver of the right was coerced"; it is only when "a lawyer was merely 'secured' on the
defendant's behalf' that such a presumption cannot be entertained. Id.
154. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 310 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The adversary
posture of the parties, which is not fully solidified until formal charges are brought, will inevitably
tend to color the advice offered.").
155. Cf Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-91 (1972) (explaining that following the "initia-
tion of judicial criminal proceedings," once "the government has committed itself to prosecute" and
"the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified," his primary protections are the
"explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment").
156. Devallis Rutledge, Sixth Amendment Waivers: The rules just changed in law enforce-
ment's favor, POLICE: THE L. ENFORCEMENT MAG., Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.policemag.com/
Channel/Patrol/Articles/2009/08/Sixth-Amendment-Waivers.aspx (emphasis added).
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By limiting its holding to custodial situations, the Montejo majority cre-
ated a loophole through which police may approach (and reapproach)
represented defendants in efforts to secure a waiver. The Court briefly ac-
knowledged this possibility, but quickly dismissed any concerns:
"uncovered situations are the least likely to pose a risk of coerced waivers.
When a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his
door or walk away to avoid police badgering."17 Montejo thereby suggests
that it is the defendant's responsibility to avoid being badgered, contrary to
prior precedent placing an affirmative obligation on police officers to ab-
stain from harassing the accused.'" The Court in Montejo was convinced
that badgering is not a concern due to the prophylactic protections secured
by Miranda and its progeny."' These cases, however, involve custodial in-
terrogations, and thus offer little guidance as to permissible police behavior
in non-custodial settings. Montejo disregards the fact that compelling pres-
sures can still exist in non-custodial situations.'6 Since, prior to Montejo,
police were forbidden from contacting any represented defendants, what
police actions would constitute badgering in Sixth Amendment contexts
remains unclear. Lower courts will likely be inconsistent in their definitions
of badgering, creating a distinct possibility that defendants in some jurisdic-
tions will be subjected to a much more visible police presence and their
coercive tactics, and thus feel a pressure to waive their rights.
157. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090.
158. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (reaffirming that the prophy-
lactic rule of Edwards-prohibiting police from approaching a defendant once he has invoked
counsel-is "designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police offi-
cers"); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988) (finding that the Edwards rule against police
badgering prohibited an officer from reinitiating contact even to pursue a separate investigation
because "to a suspect who has indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interro-
gation by requesting counsel, any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will
surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling"). Further, as the Court
clarified in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1984), the Edwards prohibition was extended to
prevent any "'badger[ing]' or 'overreaching'-explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional" that
"might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding
his earlier request for counsel's assistance."
159. As the majority explained:
Under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases ... a defendant who does not want to speak
to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and
given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not only must the immediate contact end, but
'badgering' by later requests is prohibited." Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090. Miranda and Ed-
wards did not explicitly consider police "badgering," but the Court has since held that the
protections of Edwards-prohibiting re-interrogation of an accused in custody if he has clearly
invoked his right to counsel-are "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into
waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). Moreover, under Minnick, a court would likely
find badgering if the defendant requested counsel in a custodial situation and then officials reiniti-
ated interrogation without counsel present. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990).
160. See supra Section II.B.
161. It is important to note that while Montejo does increase access of police and prosecutors
to represented defendants, a recent memorandum from a local prosecutor's office indicates that they
may be reticent to engage in such behavior. See Email from Timothy McMorrow, Assistant Prose-
cuting Attomey, Kent County Prosecutor's Office, to Janice Kittel Mann, Assistant Prosecuting
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Furthermore, the exposure of defendants to questioning in non-custodial
situations is exacerbated by a recent decision that weakened the very protec-
tions that the Montejo majority relied upon as sufficient to safeguard
represented defendants. In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court held that even
when a custodial defendant invokes his Edwards right to counsel, which
originally barred any further police interrogation, police may reapproach
that defendant for questioning fourteen days after he is released from cus-
tody.162 And, while release from custody may mean the defendant is out on
bail, it can also mean that he merely returned to the general prison popula-
tion-a setting that Shatzer deemed non-custodial. 6 Together, the holdings
of Shatzer and Montejo suggest that if police attempt to engage in custodial
interrogation with a defendant post-arraignment, and if that defendant in-
vokes his right to counsel, police can merely release that defendant and then
reapproach him fourteen days later. Although such tactics would hopefully
render any waiver involuntary, it does not preclude the possibility that upon
further questioning, a defendant might feel his access to counsel had been
denied and waive his rights, particularly if in the interim fourteen-day period
he had returned to his prison cell and lacked the opportunity to seek advice
from his attorney, family, or friends. 64
D. Montejo's Implications for Vulnerable Defendants
Montejo creates the risk that police, in attempting to secure a waiver,
might engage in constitutionally questionable conduct, and the decision thus
poses a danger to all represented defendants. However, it presents poten-
tially more serious concerns about the guarantee of counsel during
interrogation for less sophisticated defendants. The Supreme Court has
noted the essential value of counsel for mentally retarded,' illiterate,'6 un-
educated," and juvenile defendants.16 But, as noted by numerous studies,
Attorney, Kent County Prosecutor's Office (June 16, 2009, 11:22 AM) (on file with author).
However, police, who do not face similar legal constraints, may not be so tentative in their interroga-
tion techniques. See Rutledge, supra note 156.
162. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1222-23 (2010).
163. Id. at 1224-25.
164. Id. at 1232, 1234 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002) ("Mentally retarded defendants may
be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and ... in the aggregate face a special risk
of wrongful execution.").
166. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 511 (1962) (noting the unfairness of trying an illiter-
ate defendant who lacked counsel).
167. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 720 (1948) (plurality opinion) ("This Court has
been particularly solicitous to see that [the Sixth Amendment] right was carefully preserved where
the accused was ignorant and uneducated . . . ").
168. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 68-69 (1932). There, the Court emphasized the
importance of counsel to those with special needs:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law.... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
244 [Vol. 109:221
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mentally handicapped and adolescent defendants have serious difficulties
comprehending the right to counsel during interrogation.'6 The fact that,
post-Montejo, represented defendants have to repeatedly reassert their desire
to have an attorney present during interrogation is confusing and counterin-
tuitive, not only for the average defendant, but especially for those who
are more vulnerable.'7 ' For example, at the initial court proceeding, a defen-
dant might invoke counsel and have an attorney appointed. Then, despite
that request, police could initiate interrogation and read Miranda warnings
that again inform the defendant of his right to have counsel appointed, not-
withstanding the fact that he had already retained counsel. These conflicting
scenarios "would be confusing to anyone, but would be especially baffling
to defendants with mental disabilities or other impairments." 72
Finally, because juvenile, mentally impaired, and vulnerable defendants
all "share characteristics that make them highly suggestible and disposed to
defer to authority figures," they may waive their rights at the suggestion of
police, thinking that cooperation with law enforcement will be beneficial to
their case, without fully realizing the consequences of surrendering coun-
sel.17 Therefore, in order to sufficiently protect vulnerable defendants and to
prevent "exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused
without counsel being present," it is necessary to adopt measures prohibiting
defense, even though he ha[d] a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. See generally Brief for The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici
Curiae on the Supplemental Question Supporting Petitioner, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 2079
(2009) (No. 07-1529) [hereinafter NACDL Brief] (arguing that vulnerable defendants, including
juveniles, are in special need of the assistance of counsel).
169. NACDL Brief, supra note 168, at 8-10. The brief discusses several important studies
involving the right to counsel. In the first experiment, a test was designed to measure mentally dis-
abled subjects on their understanding of their right to an attorney; the average for that group was 35
percent. Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally
Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 556-57 (2002). The other studies found that, among
juvenile suspects, the least understood of the Miranda rights was the right to counsel during ques-
tioning. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 1134, 1154 (1980). Additionally, a waiver or acknowledgement of the Miranda rights
may only "reflect compliance with authority rather than an actual subjective appreciation of the
meaning of the warning." Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 44, 78 (2006).
170. The Montejo dissent details the inadequacy of Miranda warnings in informing already
represented defendants as to what rights they are actually giving up:
While it can be argued that informing an indicted but unrepresented defendant of his right to
counsel at least alerts him to the fact that he is entitled to obtain something he does not already
possess, providing that same warning to a defendant who has already secured counsel is more
likely to confound than enlighten.
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. NACDL Brief, supra note 168, at 7-8.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. at 7-8.
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or severely limiting the ability of represented defendants to waive their right
to counsel following the initiation of formal charges.17 4
III. How TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Part III analyzes different opportunities to better safeguard the right to
counsel for non-custodial represented defendants. Section III.A suggests
different strategies available to defense attorneys to increase their clients'
protections: first, they may attempt to alter the current conception of custo-
dial interrogation; and second, they can dispute the validity of the
represented defendants' waiver. However, Section II.A ultimately recog-
nizes that such tactics may prove ineffective. Therefore, because such
strategies will not fully protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Sec-
tion II.B concludes that state and federal judiciaries should adopt a new
rule that will successfully shield represented non-custodial defendants from
the pressure to waive their right to counsel.
A. Strategies for Defense Counsel
1. Arguing that the Interrogation Took Place in Custody
While this solution is insufficient to wholly remedy the problems caused
by Montejo, in some cases, defense attorneys seeking to increase the protec-
tions available to a non-custodial client may rely on Miranda protections
and attempt to expand the definition of custodial environment. As discussed
at length in Part II, the prophylactic rights guaranteeing counsel are gener-
ally more accessible to custodial defendants; thus, there is great incentive
for the defense to persuade the court of the existence of custody. If an attor-
ney could establish that the defendant was in a custodial environment and
police either failed to issue warnings or interrogated the defendant after he
had invoked counsel (the more likely scenario), any information procured
from the defendant would be inadmissible because the officer had initiated
contact with a custodial defendant, and his waiver would be invalid.'
Convincing the court that a defendant was interrogated while in custody
may be feasible since the presence of custody requires a fact-specific, case-
by-case analysis. First, courts should examine the objective circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, as opposed to "the subjective views harbored
by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."' Sec-
ond, courts must consider whether a reasonable person in those
circumstances would have felt that he was not "at liberty to terminate the
174. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
175. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2081 ("Under Miranda, any suspect subject to custodial interroga-
tion must be advised of his right to have a lawyer present. Under Edwards, once such a defendant
'has invoked his [Miranda] right,' interrogation must stop. And under Minnick v Mississippi, no
subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present.") (citations omitted).
176. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam).
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interrogation and leave" the situation."' The Supreme Court requires a fac-
tual ad hoc analysis for each case, considering how a reasonable person
"would gauge the breadth of his or her 'freedom of action." 7 1
Beyond this intensive factual inquiry, there is also significant divergence
between federal and state courts in their definitions of custody. Jurisdictions
consider a variety of factors as relevant in the custody determination, includ-
ing 1) the number and nature of the interrogator(s)-for example, if the
officer is in uniform, carrying a visible weapon, or is known and trusted by
the suspect;'79 2) the nature of the suspect-his age, intelligence, knowledge,
sophistication, and mental and physical condition may be relevant;so 3) the
time and place of the interrogation; 4) the nature of the interrogation-
including the duration, number of questions asked, tone of questions, for-
mality of answers (spontaneous oral or signed written statement), whether
the defendant was isolated, and whether the defendant was confronted with
unfavorable evidence;'"' and 5) the progress of the investigation at the time
of the interrogation. Additionally, some lower courts have performed an
even more extensive analysis, accounting for the subjective views of the
defendant and law enforcement officials.' Therefore, depending on the
177. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
178. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325.
179. People v. Clebum, 782 P.2d 784, 786 (Colo. 1989) (considering the presence of two
armed law enforcement officers and reliance upon the friendly relationship between the officer and
defendant to subtly coerce a waiver as pointing in favor of custody).
180. People v. Vasquez, 913 N.E.2d 60, 65 (111. App. Ct. 2009) (considering the age, intelli-
gence, and mental makeup of the accused).
181. Cleburn, 782 P.2d at 786 (considering the fact that officers initiate the interaction and the
length of the communication as determinative factors in the custody determination).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Grey Water, 395 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (D. N.D. 2005), quoting
the Eighth Circuit, which identified six factors used to determine when, under the totality of the
circumstances, a suspect is in custody:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was vo-
luntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the
suspect was not considered under arrest;
(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning;
(3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official
requests to respond to questioning;
(4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning;
(5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; or
(6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.
See also People v. Fletcher, 768 N.E.2d 72, 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (considering "the location, time,
length, mood, and mode of the interrogation, the number of police officers present, the presence or
absence of the family and friends of the accused, any indicia of formal arrest, and the age, intelli-
gence, and mental makeup of the accused" in making a custody determination).
183. E.g., United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
subjective intent of the police was relevant, if not dispositive, in assessing custodial interrogation);
People v. Calhoun, 889 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) ("[The inquiry should focus on what
the defendant thought and believed" about the situation, as well as the subjective intent of the offi-
cers.); Curtis v. State, 754 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (considering, in determining
whether the suspect was in custody for purposes of Miranda, "l) whether probable cause to arrest
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jurisdiction, defense lawyers may have a wide range of arguments available
to convince the court that the questioning of their client constituted custodial
interrogation.
Although it is to a defendant's advantage if his attorney can manage to
convince the court that the interrogation was custodial, judicial outcomes
are often unpredictable because of the diversity in considerable factors. This
hazy standard of custody will only create more disparities between different
jurisdictions. Furthermore, it will increase the amount of litigation in lower
courts as defendants have great incentive to challenge police-initiated inter-
actions on the theory that they were effectively deprived of their liberty or
freedom of movement, forcing the courts to undergo laborious fact-intensive
reviews and to reevaluate their conceptions of custody.
2. Disputing the Validity of a Waiver
In order to better protect a represented defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, defense attorneys could also argue that their client's waiver
was neither knowing nor voluntary because he was not sufficiently aware of
the assistance his lawyer could provide him during interrogation. Although
the Montejo majority noted that a Sixth Amendment waiver following Mi-
randa warnings was valid regardless of representation, attorneys could
advocate a higher standard for the warnings read to represented defendants
before they waive. Such a standard would extend beyond the prescribed
conditions of Miranda and better inform defendants of the right they are
surrendering. Certain jurisdictions have adopted this approach, holding
that prior to a Sixth Amendment waiver, a defendant requires more than just
a reading of the Miranda warnings to guarantee that he understands "the
nature and the importance of the . .. right he [is] giving up.",1 6 The fact that
existed, 2) whether the defendant was the focus of the investigation, 3) the subjective intent of the
police, and 4) the subjective belief of the defendant").
184. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2092 (2009).
185. Such a warning could follow the procedures established to ensure a higher standard of
waiver in United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980). In Mohabir, the court explained
that while Miranda waivers could be express or implied, "a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to have counsel present during post-indictment interrogation must be preceded by a federal
judicial officer's explanation of the content and significance of this right." Id. at 1153. Additionally,
for those individuals arrested after indictment, a judicial officer must present the indictment to the
defendant, explain its significance, inform the defendant of his right to counsel, and describe the
potential consequences of making un-counseled statements to authorities. Id.
186. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1151. In Callabrass, the Court required that in order for a defen-
dant to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, he should receive:
in addition to the usual Miranda warnings . . . explanations along the following general lines:
that a criminal indictment has been filed, with explanation of the significance of that fact; that
the results of the defendant's case could be seriously affected by any statements he makes at
this time; that defendants customarily obtain the advice of lawyers in these circumstances, and
that a lawyer would be better able to understand and advise the defendant as to the desirability
and the dangers of making statements and answering questions. The explanations necessary
may of course vary depending on the age, experience and emotional condition of the defen-
dant, as well as other factors.
United States v. Callabrass, 458 F. Supp. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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the Supreme Court has declined to impose such a standard' does not pre-
vent lower courts from mandating more stringent waiver criteria for
represented defendants.*
Still, even if lower courts adopted a heightened waiver standard, the
general limits placed on both the voluntary and knowing prongs have sub-
stantially altered the ability of criminal defendants and their attorneys to
contest the admissibility of any information given to a state official." 9 First,
a defendant's waiver will not be deemed involuntary unless his statement
was coerced;'" that is, there must be a direct causative link between the po-
lice conduct and the statement of the criminal suspect.'9' Equally difficult to
establish is the failure of a defendant to make a knowing and intelligent
waiver. While a defendant must have some awareness of the rights he is ab-
andoning, it need not necessarily be a full "informedness." 92 In general, a
suspect is considered aware of his rights as soon as he receives Miranda
warmings.'93
Furthermore, courts assess the voluntariness and intelligence of a waiver
by weighing "'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. ""u Often,
in examining a waiver, the judge will "make no inquiry whatsoever into the
defendant's background, the defendant's educational history, the defendant's
mental or physical condition, or the defendant's prior dealings with attor-
neys."'" And, even if lower courts do consider such factors, valid waivers
187. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 n,11 (1988) ("[Rleject[ing] Mohabir's holding
that some 'additional' warnings or discussions with an accused are required" and that any waiver
"can only properly be made before a neutral ... judicial officer") (internal citations omitted).
188. See Halama, supra note 31, at 1235-37.
189. See Halama, supra note 31, at 1217; Tomkovicz, supra note 50, at 1045. Additionally,
the Court's requirement that a defendant must have a full awareness has typically carried little
weight. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985) ("This Court has never embraced the theory
that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness.").
190. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that "coercive police activity is
a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). However, "failure to give the prescribed warn-
ings ... generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained" as they will be deemed
involuntary. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
191. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.
192. Jennifer Diana, Note, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh my!: Fellers, the Sixth
Amendment, and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 985, 995-96 (2005);
see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,422 (1986) (finding that police are not required to "supply
a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to
speak or stand by his rights").
193. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988).
194. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
195. Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGs L.J. 1031, 1075-76 (2006) (quoting Andrew Horwitz, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases: The Law and the Reality in Rhode Island District Court, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REv. 409, 424 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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are often found where the suspect has limited intelligence and education,'
is experiencing abnormal physical or mental conditions,'9' or is suffering
from drug or alcohol addiction.' Moreover, while the burden rests with the
state to prove a voluntary and knowing waiver, the prosecution may fulfill
its obligation without evidence of express relinquishment by the defen-
dant.'"
These hurdles pose a difficult challenge for defense attorneys attempting
to demonstrate the invalidity of a waiver. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
noted that demonstrating at trial that police provided Miranda warnings and
secured a waiver from a defendant "has generally produced a virtual ticket
of admissibility" for statements made to law enforcement officials.200 Fur-
thermore, because lower courts consider a plethora of different factors in
examining the totality of the circumstances, the same potential problems
triggered by defense attorneys' custody arguments are present here: courts
will face difficult, case-based factual analyses and increased litigation will
further clog the system.
196. See, e.g., Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 749-52 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding valid waiver
even though defendant was illiterate, had a mild mental handicap, and initially had difficulty under-
standing Miranda warnings); United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding
valid waiver by defendant with a learning disability); United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F3d 1360,
1365-66 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding valid waiver by Mexican defendant with a sixth-grade education
because he was read his Miranda rights in Spanish); Moore v. Dugger, 856 F.2d 129, 132, 134-35
(llth Cir. 1988) (finding valid waiver by a mentally handicapped defendant with below-average IQ
and intellectual capacity of an eleven-year-old because he appeared calm, responsive, and able to
understand questions). But see United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1998) (find-
ing a waiver invalid where a defendant was borderline retarded and had language difficulties
because no steps were taken to ensure the waiver was knowing and intelligent).
197. See, e.g., Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 554 (6th Cir. 2000) (valid waiver even
though the defendant was questioned in a hospital's intensive care unit following a suicide attempt);
United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 550 (4th Cir. 1997) (valid waiver after suspect suffered a car
accident and a broken shoulder because he was not under the influence of judgment-impairing me-
dication); Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding valid waiver despite the
fact defendant had undergone recent surgery, ingested pain medication, and claimed to have pain
and dizziness); United States. v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1986) (waiver valid despite
gunshot wound to defendant's mouth).
198. See, e.g., Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1230 (1lth Cir. 2001) (finding valid
waiver despite the defendant's intoxication and alcohol withdrawal because he did not show symp-
toms); United States v. Smith, 218 F.3d 777, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding valid waiver despite
the fact that defendant ingested cocaine and sleeping pills forty-five minutes prior to her arrest be-
cause she did not appear intoxicated and law enforcement officials were not aware of her drug use);
United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 60-61 (1 st Cir. 2000) (finding valid waiver despite the defen-
dant's heroin withdrawal and use of antidepressants); United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 E3d 142,
171-72 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding valid waiver despite the fact that the defendant had ingested a large
dose of Valium because he was a habitual user who could have developed a tolerance).
199. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1979) ("[An express written or oral
statement of waiver . . . is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably
either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.. . . [lIn at least some cases, waiver can be clearly
inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.").
200. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). The Court has also noted that "cases in
which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'com-
pelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are
rare." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984).
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B. What the Lower Courts Should Do to Protect the
Attorney-Client Relationship
Since defense attorneys may not always be successful in disputing a
waiver's validity, or in demonstrating after the fact that their client was enti-
tled to counsel, state or federal courts should take measures to grant a more
thorough right to counsel to represented defendants. To adequately protect
the attorney-client relationship and guarantee counsel during interrogation,
judiciaries should adopt an approach that would, following the initiation of
formal charges, prohibit police-initiated questioning of all defendants who
have invoked their right to an attorney.201 The rule would bar police ques-
tioning in the absence of counsel only once formal proceedings had
commenced and a defendant requested counsel. The defendant's custodial
status would be irrelevant. This rule would protect defendants from coercive
police techniques when they have expressly indicated their desire to deal
with the police only through the assistance of counsel.2 02
State courts may be able to draw such a right from their state constitu-
tions, adopting substantive or procedural waiver requirements that must be
completed to effectuate a valid Sixth Amendment waiver. Additionally, fed-
eral circuit courts can draw broader protections from the U.S. Constitution,
expanding upon any gaps left in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Not only
would these lower court initiatives more adequately preserve the fundamen-
tal guarantee of the right to counsel, but they would also prevent police from
engaging in any constitutionally questionable conduct and protect vulner-
able defendants otherwise in danger of unintentionally surrendering their
rights to an attorney and a fair prosecution.
The implementation of this rule is certainly plausible, as some states
have demonstrated a willingness to increase criminal defendant protections
above the constitutional floor. Indeed, certain jurisdictions have embraced
approaches similar to those mentioned above, interpreting their constitutions
to provide increased protections for represented defendants. The Supreme
Court of Illinois has held that its state constitution mandates a higher
standard than the protections offered by federal law, ensuring counsel for
defendants in traditional Sixth Amendment contexts. 203 Police cannot refuse
an attorney access to a defendant and "there can be no knowing waiver of
the right to counsel if the suspect has not been informed that the attorney
was present and seeking to consult with him."2  The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the right of a defendant to his attorney is not predicated on
the suspect making a specific request for representation.205 When an attorney
201. Unlike the Jackson rule, this solution would not apply to all defendants, but rather to
those who have expressed a desire for counsel.
202. Cf Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988) ("[A suspect's] request for counsel
... raise[s] the presumption that he is unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice.").
203. People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 938 (Ill. 1994).
204. Id. at 930 (citing People v. Smith, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (Ill. 1982)).
205. State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630, 643 (N.J. 1993).
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is available to the defendant, no custodial interrogation is permitted until the
two have had the opportunity to confer.20
Perhaps the state that goes the farthest in protecting the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel is New York, with its judicial mandate of an "indelible
right to counsel." The New York Constitution provides that:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to ap-
pear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with
the witnesses against him or her. . . . nor shall he or she be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself. 207
Courts in New York have interpreted this provision to mean that interroga-
tion of a suspect is forbidden unless the suspect affirmatively waives his
right to counsel in the presence of an attorney.208 This "indelible" right to
counsel attaches "when a criminal action is formally commenced by the
filing of an accusatory instrument" regardless of whether he is questioned in
or out of custody.209 The right can also arise prior to a formal charge, either
when the suspect requests to speak to an attorney or if an attorney is re-
210
tained to represent the suspect for the matter under investigation.
However, following formal initiation of charges, the ban on interrogation
does not hinge on the defendant's invocation of counsel, nor on a request
from the attorney that police respect defendant's rights.211 Once an attorney
is involved in the case, law enforcement officials may not question the de-
206. Id.
207. N.Y CONsT. art. I, § 6.
208. E.g., People v. Grice, 794 N.E.2d 9, 10 (N.Y 2003) ("The indelible right to counsel
arises from the provision of the State Constitution that guarantees due process of law, the right to
effective assistance of counsel and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." (citations
omitted)); People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y 1990) ("[B]y resting the right [to counsel]
upon this State's constitutional provisions guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination, the
right to assistance of counsel and due process of law we have provided protection to accuseds far
more expansive than the Federal counterpart." (citations omitted)); People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d
612, 617 (N.Y 1978) ("[The state is] forbidden to seek an uncounseled waiver of an indicted defen-
dant's right to counsel."); see also Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What
is Interrogation? When does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 88 (1978) (explaining that the state may not
question a client in the absence of counsel regarding "'matters encompassed by the representa-
tion.'" (citing People v. Ramos, 357 N.E.2d 955, 963-64 (N.Y. 1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting))); Ofer
Raban, The Embarassing Saga of New York's Derivative Right to Counsel: The Right to Counsel of
Defendants Suspected of Two Unrelated Crimes, 80 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 389, 390 (2006) (explaining
that courts likely make right-to-counsel determinations based on the clustering together of these
phrases in Article I, section 6).
209. Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 10.
210. Id. at 10-11 (finding that the indelible right can be triggered before a suspect faces pros-
ecution when he requests, in custody, to speak to an attorney, or "when an attorney who is retained
to represent the suspect enters the matter under investigation").
211. People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897 (N.Y. 1976) (quoting People v. Arthur, 239
N.E.2d 537, 539 (N.Y. 1968)).
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fendant without counsel unless the attorney has been present for the defen-
212dant's valid waiver.
Despite the possibility of bolstering the constitutional guarantee of the
right to counsel, many states and federal courts have refused to provide de-
fendants with increased protections as described above, and several have
declined to adopt a rule mirroring New York's indelible right to counsel.213
Critics believe that the New York rule creates artificial barriers for police
investigation 214 and "place[s] an unfair burden on law enforcement authori-
ties."215 Even academics favoring the rule have noted its uniquely zealous
216role in securing expansive defendant rights. But, much of the criticism of
New York's indelible right results from the state's protection of suspects
before the commencement of formal proceedings.2 17 Indeed, because it
would impose a significant handicap on investigatory efforts and inflict a
"substantial cost to society's legitimate and substantial interest in securing
admissions of guilt," the Supreme Court has held that, prior to a formal
charge, any confession following an otherwise valid waiver should not be
suppressed because police failed to inform the suspect of his attorney's ef-
forts to reach him.
Clearly, the current doctrine on waivers following the attachment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is divided among the state and circuit
courts. But, jurisdictions that are hesitant to adopt a rule that extends as far
as New York's "indelible right" can adopt the rule that strikes a balance be-
tween law enforcement needs and the rights of criminal defendants. A rule
as proposed in the beginning of Section III.B-one that only prohibits inter-
rogation of represented defendants in the absence of counsel after the
initiation of formal charges-would mitigate many critics' concerns about
the ability of police to obtain and successfully admit at trial confessions se-
cured from suspects in the absence of counsel; the rule would still allow
police to interrogate potential suspects and unrepresented defendants.
212. Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 10; see also Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment Dur-
ing Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 429-32 (2009).
213. E.g., United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Baker,
401 E Supp. 722, 728 (E.D. Wis. 1975); State v. Jackson, 290 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Neb. 1980).
214. Fuentes v. Moran, 572 F. Supp. 1461, 1471 (D.R.I. 1983).
215. Richard C. Williams, Jr., The Uncounselled Confession: A New York Variant, 14 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 343, 344 (1979).
216. See Holland, supra note 212, at 431 (noting that the indelible right to counsel rule is "an
aggressive constitutionalization of the attorney-client relationship under state law").
217. E.g., Debra M. Zverins, Note, The Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, 10 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 351, 353 (1982) (arguing that the New York rule imposes "onerous burdens on police
departments which impede effective law enforcement;" "sacrifice[s] the effective operation of the
criminal justice system by restricting the ability of the police to obtain confessions from criminal
suspects in the absence of counsel;" and hinders "police efforts to control crime").
218. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986).
219. Cf Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application
of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 938 (1983) (noting the "prisoner's dilemma"
posed by the exclusionary rule, and the competing goals of criminal procedure: the desire to submit
reliable evidence and thwart criminals while protecting defendant rights from overzealous police
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Additionally, because it would be limited to defendants who ask for counsel,
it would appease opponents of the former Jackson rule who are wary of
granting protection to those defendants who have "done nothing at all to
express [their] intentions with respect to [their] Sixth Amendment rights"
and might be "perfectly amenable to speaking with the police without hav-
ing counsel present."220 Though it may be necessary to grant increased
flexibility to law enforcement in their pre-indictment investigation, once an
indictment has been filed or a defendant arraigned, "any further interroga-
tion can only be designed to buttress the government's case."22' Indeed, the
initiation of formal proceedings "presumably signals the government's con-
clusion that it has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case."222
Thus, after the first formal state interaction, represented defendants should
be free from any police-initiated interrogation without counsel.
In jurisdictions where appointment of counsel is automatic, however, a
defendant may not have the opportunity to clearly invoke his right to coun-
sel.22 Thus, courts there should take affirmative measures to ensure that the
defendant does indeed intend to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Arguably, jurisdictions that have adopted the automatic appoint-
ment approach have already recognized the importance of counsel, and
accordingly "place[d] the burden on courts, not indigent defendants, to en-
sure that defendants are represented absent a valid waiver."2 24 Montejo
effectively subverts the policies that led to these regional decisions to enact
automatic appointment of counsel. In those jurisdictions, what was intended
to provide additional protection to defendants beyond the federal constitu-
tional floor has become a procedure that actually diminishes defendants'
protections (when they do not affirmatively assert that they want counsel) by
granting the police further opportunities to elicit a waiver.225
Still, to address the issue that "a defendant who never asked for counsel
has not yet made up his mind in the first instance,"226 courts should clarify at
the first formal proceeding whether the defendant desires counsel before the
automatic appointment is triggered. At that time, courts would ask the de-
officers). By allowing evidence procured before the Sixth Amendment right takes effect, a modified
New York rule would attempt to strike a compromise between the two objectives.
220. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2087 (2009).
221. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 306 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id.; see also Banas, supra note 44, at 828-29 (quoting Patterson, 487 U.S. at 306).
223. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082-84. The Court notes that in states such as Louisiana,
where counsel is automatically appointed within seventy-two hours of arrest, defendants often "have
no opportunity to invoke their rights and trigger Jackson." Id. at 2084.
224. Brief of The National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2-3, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009); see also id. ("[Tihe vast majority of
jurisdictions encourage representation of indigent defendants, recognizing that representation by
counsel is beneficial to indigent defendants and the criminal justice system as a whole, both in terms
of fairness and efficiency.").
225. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2086 ("When a court appoints counsel for an indigent defen-
dant in the absence of any request on his part, there is no basis for a presumption that any
subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary.").
226. Id. at 2087.
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fendant specifically if he wants to be represented.227 A negative response
would be construed as a valid Sixth Amendment waiver, and police could
freely reapproach to continue interrogation. Conversely, an affirmative re-
sponse would erect a barrier between the police and the now-represented
defendant. This limited measure would not impose a significant burden on
the courts or the prosecution, nor would it spark subsequent fact-intensive
reviews about whether the defendant's conduct manifested an acceptance of
228the appointment of counsel. Rather, this rule would offer unambiguous
evidence of whether the defendant did or did not wish to invoke his right to
an attorney. Alternatively, if judges did not inquire about the defendant's
desire for counsel at the first formal proceeding, the protections of the rule
could still be triggered if the defendant subsequently invoked his Sixth
Amendment right to an attorney, whether during an interrogation, a post-
indictment, pretrial lineup, or any future interaction with the State.
Lower courts seeking to modify the rule could allow defendants to waive
counsel after the initiation of formal proceedings, but there should be a pre-
sumption of invalidity in cases where the defendant is represented,
particularly where he has invoked his right at an earlier interaction with law
enforcement.29 Courts could also permit defense attorneys to file and serve
notices declaring that their clients have not and will not waive their rights.230
But regardless of what measures are taken by state and federal courts, in-
creased protections are necessary in order to "breathe[] life into the
requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intel-
ligent and voluntary."231
CONCLUSION
By increasing the abilities of police to approach, interrogate, and induce
waivers at any stage in criminal proceedings, Montejo v. Louisiana puts all
defendants at risk. The decision, which conflates the waiver requirements of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, is particularly troubling
227. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101(1)
(2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.040 (2009); MICH. CT. R. 6.005(A); N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:4-2(b)(4).
228. Contra Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court maintains that determination of "whether
a defendant has somehow invoked his right to counsel" demands an analysis of "his conduct at the
preliminary hearing-his statements and gestures-and the totality of the circumstances." Id. It
concludes that "for a court to adjudicate that question ex post would be a fact-intensive and burden-
some task" particularly because "preliminary hearings are often rushed, and are frequently not
recorded or transcribed." Id.
229. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.] (1975) (White, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without
legal advice, a later decision at the authorities' insistence to make a statement without counsel's
presence may properly be viewed with skepticism.").
230. The Montejo Court noted in dicta that Miranda rights cannot be asserted "anticipatorily."
See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091 (relying on the Miranda and Edwards proposition that a suspect
must invoke his rights during custodial interrogation). However, these cases involved the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel. Once formal proceedings have begun and a defendant has counsel, his
attorney should be able to prevent waiver of that right.
231. People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898 (N.Y 1976).
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for represented defendants in non-custodial settings. These defendants have
expressed their desire for counsel, but after the Court's ruling in Montejo,
that desire may go unheeded. Defendants will be increasingly exposed to
police pressure to waive their right to an attorney, and may relinquish their
constitutional privilege without a full awareness of the consequences of their
action. Thus, states should use their individual constitutions, or federal
courts should interpret more broadly the U.S. Constitution, to grant in-
creased protections to defendants who have invoked counsel, securing the
presence of a lawyer for any situation post-arraignment that involves police
questioning.
As a culture, we are fascinated with lawyers. We love them; we love to
hate them; we are avidly fixated on portraying them in film, television, and
12literature-be they the protagonist with an unflagging moral compass or
legal counsel to an evil corporation that profits at the expense of poor, sick
plaintiffs. 233 But despite our ambivalence toward the profession, few would
maintain that attorneys are unnecessary or irrelevant to any legal proceed-
ing. In fact, given our belief in the importance of lawyers, many would
probably be surprised to discover that most offenders never even meet with
an attorney. According to multiple studies, approximately 80 percent of
criminal suspects waive their right to counsel.234 Given the vast amount of
waivers, it is of the utmost importance to protect the relationship between
attorneys and their clients when a defendant actually makes an explicit re-
quest for counsel. When a defendant waives his constitutional right to
counsel, it must be plainly apparent that he is doing so knowingly and vol-
untarily. Criminal defendants are deprived of a great many rights as a result
of their status in society. While some of these deprivations are justifiable, we
cannot take away a defendant's choice to fully exercise a constitutional
guarantee to counsel.
232. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1339, 1339
(1999) (maintaining that "[n]o real-life lawyer has done more for the self-image or public perception
of the legal profession" than Atticus Finch).
233. See, e.g., MICHAEL CLAYTON (Warner Bros. 2007) (portraying the character of Karen
Crowder, played by Tilda Swinton).
234. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 130, at 859; Leo, supra note 130, at 275-76.
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